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ISRAEL'S SECURITY BARRIER: EFFECTS ON OPERATIONAL FACTORS

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College of the Department of the Navy.

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09 February 2004

Abstract of

ISRAEL'S SECURITY BARRIER: EFFECTS ON OPERATIONAL FACTORS

The Israeli government has recently begun construction of a security barrier around the West Bank which is designed to halt terrorist infiltrations attacking the population centers of the Israeli Mediterranean coastal plain. The West Bank has become more than just land mass for defense from conventional attack, it has been incorporated into an Israeli defensive ideology which is militarily questionable in combating terrorism.

The Israeli security barrier will positively influence the factors of space, time and force enabling a better defense of the Israeli population against terrorist infiltrators. The route of the barrier is under intense discussion at this time and if implemented as planned by the Sharon government will negatively affect the factors of space and force. The barrier must be constructed along the correct route in order to maximize operational factors.



Figure 1. Map of Israel. Reprinted from The Jerusalem Post, <http://info.jpost.com/C001/Supplements/MapCenter/> (03 February 2004).




Figure 2. Map of Israeli separation options for the West Bank circa July 2003. Reprinted from Foundation for Middle East Peace, <http://www.fmep.org/reports/2003/v13n4.html#map>, (03 February 2004).

## **ISRAEL'S SECURITY BARRIER: EFFECTS ON OPERATIONAL FACTORS**

Ariel Sharon's visit to the Dome of the Rock in September 2000 set the second intifada into motion and has led to a drastic increase in the level of violence between Israelis and Palestinians. The Palestinians have changed their resistance tactics from stone throwing mobs to terror attacks and suicide bombers aimed at the heart of the Israeli populace. The Israelis have aggressively used force in retaliation hoping to destroy the terrorist groups responsible.<sup>1</sup> This has left both the Israeli and Palestinian civilian populations in the line of fire, receiving the brunt of the casualties.

The Israeli defensive problem is a complex one, mainly due to the country's small size. The West Bank protrudes into Israel reducing its width to a mere 15 kilometers.<sup>2</sup> In such a small physical area, the lines between strategic, operational and tactical depth are severely compressed, leaving little area for traditional defensive measures.

In an effort to regain defensive depth, the Israeli government has begun the process of building a security barrier that separates the Israeli population from the Palestinian West Bank. The security barrier consists of chain-link fence, barbed wire, concrete walls, trenches, access roads, dirt paths and land mines. The physical barrier is also monitored by various high-tech ground sensors as well as from the air by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).<sup>3</sup> The Israelis hope the outcome of the construction is the reduction of breaches of its defensive lines by terrorist bombers.

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<sup>1</sup> William Spencer, The Middle East (Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2003), 93.

<sup>2</sup> Aryeh Shalev, The West Bank (Tel Aviv: Praeger, 1985), 11.

<sup>3</sup> Mortimer B. Zuckerman, "Good Fences, Safe Neighbors," U.S. News & World Report, 11 (August 2003): 60.

The Israeli security barrier, when completed, will function as an effective barrier; it will increase operational depth and become a key enabler for a more effective defense against terrorist infiltration. The security barrier's many deviations from the Green Line to take in Jewish settlements on the West Bank, as well as the Israeli need to provide security for the movements of citizens to and from the settlements, reduces the barrier's effectiveness as a security cordon for the Israeli population center along the Mediterranean coast.

### **Zionism and Palestine**

The roots of the Jewish-Arab conflict go back to the time of Abraham, the father of both religions. Although helpful to keep the long history of conflict in mind, for the purposes of this paper only a review of Zionism's origins and Zionism's link to the history of Palestine over the last century is required.

The term "Zionism" was coined by Nathan Birnbaum in 1885 but it was Theodorl Herzl, in 1897, who became the true father of Zionism. Herzl, a leader of the first Zionist conference in Basel, Switzerland, established as the aim of the movement the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine.<sup>4</sup> Early efforts at creating this dream were focused on immigration to land bought from the Arabs. In addition, the Zionist leadership also began a concerted effort to gain international support for a Jewish homeland.

The First World War brought a further degree of instability to the region that would set the stage for the following century of violence. Much of this instability was brought on by a waffling British policy towards the Arabs and Jews which played each side off the other for British geopolitical needs of the moment. The first of these policy decisions which affected the Zionist cause was the MacMahon-Hussein Agreement of 1915. This agreement, made between Sir Henry MacMahon, High Commissioner of Egypt and Sharif Hussein of

Mecca, promised that in exchange for Arab rebellion against and eventual defeat of the Ottoman Empire, Britain would grant independence to the whole Arab speaking world which including Palestine. The MacMahon-Hussein Agreement was followed by another stumbling block to the Zionist aim of a Jewish state in Palestine: the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. The Sykes-Picot Agreement between the great powers split the Arab world into British, French, Russian and Italian zones of control with combined control of Jerusalem.<sup>5</sup> This agreement not only ran counter to Zionist goals, it abrogated the MacMahon-Hussein agreement which had just been penned with the Arabs.

After three years of World War, the British decided to change course once again, this time to bring the United States into the conflict on the British side.<sup>6</sup> In an attempt to curry favor with American Jews, a key voting block in American elections, Britain signed the Balfour Declaration which placed British policy in favor of the formation of a Jewish “national home” in Palestine.<sup>7</sup> Balfour was the first time a great power had endorsed the idea of a Jewish homeland and would be used by the Zionist movement as justification for continued progress to that end long after the British again changed course.

The end of World War One brought the League of Nations and its Mandate system to the region. The British Mandate was the land which includes modern day Israel, the West Bank and Jordan (then called Transjordan). Wanting to maintain better control over the area, the British decided to break up the Mandate into two countries, Palestine and Transjordan, installing Sharif Hussein’s son Abdullah on the throne in Transjordan and leaving parts of Palestine for Jewish settlement. The division was an attempt to make British policy in the

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<sup>4</sup> Avi Shalaim, The Iron Wall (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 2000), 2-3.

<sup>5</sup> Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), 93-94.

<sup>6</sup> Baylis Thomas, How Israel Was Won (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 1999), 6.

region more evenhanded although it only brought frustration and resistance for both Jew and Arab.<sup>8</sup>

The next two decades saw sporadic violence on both sides. Jews continued to immigrate into Palestine, both buying land outright from Arabs and using Ottoman land reform laws to purchase the land of absentee owners.<sup>9</sup> The first large clash of Arab and Jew began over a Zionist call for ownership over the Wailing Wall, the only remaining piece of the original wall around Jerusalem which was destroyed by the Roman General Titus in A.D. 70.<sup>10</sup> The violence was short lived but ended with a massacre of Jewish settlers in Hebron and Safed.<sup>11</sup> After calm was restored, the British responded to the violence with the Shaw Commission which found that the cause of the violence was the Jewish displacement of Arabs in Palestine and called for greater control over Jewish immigration.<sup>12</sup>

Violence continued through the next decade which in turn forced the British to keep large numbers of troops deployed in the region in order to keep what peace there was. By the 1930s the British were maintaining 18 Battalions and two RAF squadrons in Palestine.<sup>13</sup> The 1937 Peel Commission was another fact finding group searching for the cause of and solution to Arab-Jewish violence.<sup>14</sup> Its findings were that there could be no peaceful solution for a united Palestine and sought to break the area up into two sections, one a Jewish state and the other an Arab partition to be incorporated into Transjordan.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), 50.

<sup>8</sup> Shalaim, 10.

<sup>9</sup> Raja Shehadeh, Occupier's Law: Israel and the West Bank (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestinian Studies 1985), 34.

<sup>10</sup> Spencer, 87.

<sup>11</sup> Smith, 89.

<sup>12</sup> Sachar, 175.

<sup>13</sup> Thomas, 24-25.

<sup>14</sup> Shalaim, 19.

<sup>15</sup> Thomas, 25.

The British were in need of solving the Arab-Jewish problem due to the approaching storm in Europe that would engulf the world in 1939; however the problem took a back seat to Britain's immediate need for oil. In order to placate the Arab world, the British government signed a White Paper in 1939 which put it on record as supporting first, a Palestinian state, second, the reduction of Jewish immigration to Palestine and lastly the limitation of land sales to Jewish immigrants.<sup>16</sup> Zionists viewed the White Paper as a British betrayal but the time for outright Jewish revolt against the Brits would have to wait for the defeat of Nazi Germany.

Although low level Jewish resistance flourished throughout World War II, 1945 was the beginning of overt Jewish opposition to British rule of the region.<sup>17</sup> The Haganah, the Jewish Paramilitary organization began coordination with Jewish terror groups *Irgun* (National Military Organization) and *LEHI* (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) which were led by Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir respectively. The Jewish terror campaign that followed was targeted mainly against the British and killed 373 people in the first year, 300 being civilian deaths.<sup>18</sup> The increased violence forced a war weary Britain to keep over 80,000 troops in Palestine, further draining its already depleted coffers.<sup>19</sup> Britain was forced to refer the issue to the United Nations which passed UN Resolution 181 in favor of the partitioning of Palestine. The Zionist community was split on the issue of 181 with the hard corps Zionists instead favoring a return to *Eretz Israel* (Greater Israel) encompassing both sides of the Jordan River.<sup>20</sup> Pragmatists that were in favor of 181 and the creation of a state,

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<sup>16</sup> Sachar, 223.

<sup>17</sup> Munya M. Mardor, Haganah (New York: New American Library, 1957), 164.

<sup>18</sup> Thomas, 38-39.

<sup>19</sup> Smith, 129.

<sup>20</sup> Shalaim, 25.

even if it was smaller than envisaged, won the day and David Ben-Gurion declared the State of Israel to exist on 14 May 1948 in Tel Aviv, the day the British left Palestine.<sup>21</sup>

The time between the passage of UN Resolution 181 and Israeli Statehood was marked by a Zionist campaign of violence against Arabs in the attempt to create clear lines of communication throughout Palestine. This campaign created over 700,000 Palestinian refugees which settled in the Gaza strip and the West Bank with their right of return being a sticking point in peace negotiations ever since. 15 May 1948, the day after Ben-Gurion declared Statehood; the Israeli War of Independence began. The Arab armies attacked the fledgling Jewish state and the Israeli forces soundly defeated them, an event which the Arabs refer to as *al-Nakba* (the disaster), and a cease fire was implemented.<sup>22</sup> The Armistice Line or Green Line, set by the Rhodes Agreements with Jordan in 1949, became the de facto border of the State of Israel.<sup>23</sup>

The following two decades were filled with various levels of conflict between Arab and Israeli but the Armistice Line remained the border between Israel and the West Bank, giving it the legitimacy of time and therefore international acceptance.<sup>24</sup> The Six Day War of 1967 ended with the Israeli Army occupying the West Bank, a situation that exists to this day. The West Bank has, since 1967, been viewed by Israelis as a natural wall separating itself from the Arab armies, giving vital strategic and operational depth for the defense of the Israeli heartland.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Smith, 144.

<sup>22</sup> Shalaim, 31-32.

<sup>23</sup> Shalev, 4.

<sup>24</sup> Anton LaGuardia, War Without End (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2001), 369.

## “The Wall” in Zionist Thought

*Zionist colonization must either stop, or else proceed regardless of the native population. Which means that it can proceed and develop only under the protection of a power that is independent of the native population-behind an iron wall, which the native population cannot breach.*

Vladimir (Ze’ev) Jabotinsky, The Iron Wall

The term “The Wall” has been viewed differently throughout the history of Zionism. When Ze’ev Jabotinsky, an early Zionist leader, spoke of “The Iron Wall” in the 1920’s, he was speaking of building a wall of Jewish military force that could not be broken by Arab resistance. To Jabotinsky, Arabs would never accept a Jewish state in Palestine and the only way to achieve one was to do so by force. The iron wall of force had to be overwhelmingly powerful in order to deflect all Arab attempts to oust the fledgling Zionist state. Only when the Arabs finally had enough bloodshed, would moderate elements within the Arab community acknowledge the Jewish state and allow a peace to follow. “And when that happens, I am convinced that we Jews will be found ready to give them satisfactory guarantees, so that both peoples can live together in peace, like good neighbors.”<sup>26</sup> The iron wall concept gained favor among the Zionists as the violence of the 1920’s and 1930’s escalated and became the basis behind the “aggressive defense”<sup>27</sup> favored by Ben-Gurion and the Haganah and subsequently implemented in the form of Plan D<sup>28</sup> in April 1948.

The iron wall strategy has continued to be the dominant theme for Israeli security throughout the rest of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century and into the 21<sup>st</sup>. One can see the manifestation of the

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<sup>25</sup> Benjamin Netanyahu, A Place Among the Nations (New York: Bantum Books, 1993), 279.

<sup>26</sup> Vladimir (Ze’ev) Jabotinsky, The Iron Wall, 04 November 1923,

<<http://www.jabotinsky.org/Jaboworld/docs/Iron%20Wall.doc>> [23 January 2004].

<sup>27</sup> David Ben-Gurion, War Diary: The War of Independence, 1948-1949, ed. Gershon Rivlin and Elhanan Orren (Tel Aviv, 1982), 1:97-106; quoted in Shalaim, 31.

iron wall theory in the blockading of Arafat in his home in Ramallah,<sup>29</sup> the recent offensive raids into the West Bank and aerial assassinations of terrorist leaders conducted by the Israeli Defense Forces.<sup>30</sup>

Benjamin Netanyahu<sup>31</sup> a proponent of the iron wall of force when dealing with the Arabs has taken “The Wall” a bit further believing also that “the wall of the West Bank” should be incorporated into any lasting peace for Israel. The only lasting peace that Israel can have, Netanyahu insists, is one “that can be defended.”<sup>32</sup> This in turn means Israel cannot give up the “protective wall of the West Bank”<sup>33</sup> which “provides invaluable time and space”<sup>34</sup> for defense. He points out that if the Yom Kippur War had started at the Green Line, Israel would have been sliced in half and defeated. Netanyahu believes the strategic depth that comes from having the West Bank under Israeli control buys time for mobilization and thus is critical to the survival of Israel.<sup>35</sup>

Two earlier plans that further illustrate the view that the West Bank provides strategic and operational defensive depth are the Allon and Sharon Plans. The Allon Plan, drawn by Labor Leader Yigal Allon in 1967, proposed to carve out a security strip 10-15 kilometers wide with its eastern edge being the Jordan River. This strip of land would be incorporated into Israel and act as a forward line of defense for Israel as a hedge against further aggression

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<sup>28</sup> Plan D was the Jewish offensive designed to secure lines of communication preceding the declaration of statehood by Israel.

<sup>29</sup> Spencer, 94.

<sup>30</sup> John Ward Anderson and Molly Moore, “Israeli Strike Kills Hamas Political Figure,” The Washington Post, 22 August 2003, sec. A, p. 1.

<sup>31</sup> Benjamin Netanyahu is an MIT graduate, former Israeli Commando Officer, brother of one of five Israeli casualties in the Entebbe raid and former Prime Minister of Israel.

<sup>32</sup> Netanyahu, 260.

<sup>33</sup> *ibid*, 277.

<sup>34</sup> *ibid*, 277

<sup>35</sup> *ibid*, 263.

by Arab armies.<sup>36</sup> Ariel Sharon incorporated the Allon Plan (never formally implemented), and the Drobles Committee<sup>37</sup> findings (outlining ways to secure West Bank land for Israeli settlements) into his own plan in 1980 when he was Minister of Agriculture and in charge of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. The Sharon Plan called for the security belt that was the basis of the Allon Plan but added areas of “national interest”<sup>38</sup> which were the strategic highland areas of Samaria north of Jerusalem and an Israeli controlled buffer along the Green Line. In all, the Sharon Plan called for Israeli control of roughly three-quarters of the West Bank.<sup>39</sup> Ariel Sharon, as Prime Minister, has continued working towards the fulfillment of the Sharon Plan, only recently shelving plans for building a section of the barrier on the eastern side of the West Bank as a physical separation between the new Palestinian state and Jordan.<sup>40</sup>

Terrorist atrocities which continued through and after the Oslo Peace talks highlighted the vulnerability of the Israeli population to terrorist infiltration. After the 22 January 1995 bus bombing at Beit Lid of Israeli soldiers and civilians, there was serious discussion of a proposal for the construction of a physical barrier to separate Israel from Palestine.<sup>41</sup> Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin proposed building a security fence as a means of separating the Israeli and Palestinians populations from each other, giving up on the Palestinian leadership’s ability to control its own territory. The proposal was fought by the Palestinian Authority as moving for unilateral separation and by right wing Israelis who

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<sup>36</sup> Shalev, 125.

<sup>37</sup> Sachar 866-867.

<sup>38</sup> Shalaim, 588.

<sup>39</sup> Shalev, 128.

<sup>40</sup> Leslie Susser, “Rethinking the Fence”, The Jerusalem Report, 08 September 2003, p. 16.

<sup>41</sup> “Apartheid is not the Answer,” The Guardian, 28 January 1995, p. 22.

wished for *Eretz Israel* not wanting to unilaterally withdraw from the West Bank and cut off the settlements which are crucial to their expansionist dream.<sup>42</sup>

Since Rabin's 1995 proposal, internal Israeli support for a security barrier has steadily grown. Increased violence brought on by the second intifada has continued to increase the barrier's supporters.<sup>43</sup> In a recent study done by the Jaffee Center in Tel Aviv, 81% of Israelis would like to see a total separation of the Israeli and Palestinian populations with the security barrier surrounding not only Israel at the pre-1967 borders but also deviating from the Green Line to incorporate and secure all Israeli settlements in the West Bank. The support goes down to 48% when the security fence is hinged to the Green Line which in effect unilaterally gives up the settlements in exchange for secure borders.<sup>44</sup>

### **Constructing the Security Barrier**

The security barrier went from theory and planning to construction in the summer of 2002.<sup>45</sup> The barrier is little more than a reinforced fence in remote areas but in populated areas and along some highly used corridors it becomes a 30 foot concrete wall erected to limit a sniper's fields of view.<sup>46</sup> The fence is reinforced with two lane roads for patrolling and a swept dirt path which helps to reveal the footprints of infiltrators who might have passed over or through the wall. A pyramid of barbed wire is installed beyond the dirt path along with ground sensors, cameras and thermal sensors. In high use areas where a sniper could prove deadly, a concrete barrier replaces the fence. The entire barrier is further monitored with ground and air patrols as well as with unmanned aerial vehicles.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Elaine Fletcher, "Israel's Great Wall?" *Christian Science Monitor*, 27 January 1995, p. 1.

<sup>43</sup> Asher Arian, *Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2002* (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center, 2002), 11.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.* 26.

<sup>45</sup> "The Passions Aroused by Terrorism, and by an Anti-terrorism Fence," *The Economist*, 22 (June 2002): 41.

<sup>46</sup> Leslie Susser, "Security Detail," *The Jerusalem Report*, 08 September 2003, p. 17.

<sup>47</sup> John Ward Anderson, "Israel's Fence Mixes Security and Politics," *The Washington Post*, 23 September 2003, A15.

The controversy that surrounds the building of the Israeli security barrier comes from the polarizing nature of the division of Palestine. The Israeli political left does not want the fence because they believe it will end all hope of a negotiated settlement with the Palestinians. The political right does not want the fence because it will largely separate the settlements from Israel and end the dream of *Eretz Israel* which has been a large part of Zionism since the first Zionist conference. The Israeli political center wants the fence constructed as fast as possible in order to deter further violence from suicide bombers and other terror attacks.<sup>48</sup> The Palestinians do not want the fence because it cuts them off from many jobs in Israel and disrupts their daily lives.<sup>49</sup> In the end, the growing cry from the Israeli political center forced the Israeli leadership to finally begin construction.<sup>50</sup> Now that construction has started, the path of the barrier is the source of conflict.

The barrier begins in the north at the Israeli-Jordanian border, following for the most part the Green Line, deviating slightly into the West Bank to take in settlements west of Jenin. As it moves south, the barrier meets back up with the Green Line but in the area west of Nablus it again juts into the West Bank. The barrier in this area snakes in and out of the West Bank taking in Jewish settlements along with Palestinian villages while at the same time surrounding other Palestinian villages. Limited access for Palestinian travel makes accessing jobs and school nearly impossible, in effect leaving disaffected Palestinians potentially hostile to Israel in the rear of the barrier.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Arian, 26.

<sup>49</sup> Khaled Abu Toameh, "Capital Punishment," The International Jerusalem Post, 01 August 2003, p19.

<sup>50</sup> Yuval Elizur, "Israel Banks on a Fence," Foreign Affairs, (March/April 2003): 107.

<sup>51</sup> John Ward Anderson, "Israeli's to Extend Fence Line," The Washington Post, 02 October 2003, A1.

The first third of the planned barrier has been completed, some 140 miles of it at a cost of 3.2 million dollars per mile.<sup>52</sup> The southern barrier, south of Jerusalem and through the Negev, should go much faster and create much less controversy due to its sparsely populated desert terrain. That is not true however of the middle third. Already the verbal battle for Ariel and Qedumim is taking place and drawing fire both domestically and internationally.

Ariel and Qedumim are two Jewish settlements that are deep within the West Bank north of Jerusalem and south-west of Nablus, Ariel 13 miles inside the West Bank and Qedumim 7 miles north of Ariel.<sup>53</sup> If the security barrier is built to take in these two areas it will include hundreds of thousands of Palestinians on the Israeli side of the fence.<sup>54</sup> If all the planned incursions into the West Bank are constructed, the United Nations estimates there will be 274,000 Palestinians living on the Israeli side of the barrier with a further 400,000 Palestinians lives negatively affected in some way.<sup>55</sup> The wisdom of leaving this large of a potentially hostile population behind the Israeli main line of defense is militarily questionable, having more to do with ideology than military reality.

### **The Effects of the Fence on Space Time and Force**

*The intent of a cordon, then, is to withstand a slight attack-slight either because the attacker is easily discouraged or because the attacking force is small.*

*This was the function of the Great Wall of China: a protection against Tartar raids. It is also the significance of all the lines and frontier defenses of the European States bordering Asia and Turkey. In this sense, cordons are neither absurd nor ill-adapted to their purpose.*

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<sup>52</sup> Anderson, “Israel’s Fence Mixes Security and Politics,” A15.

<sup>53</sup> Anderson, “Israelis to Extend Fence Line,” A1.

<sup>54</sup> Dror Etkes, “Testimony,” U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Middle East Peace, Hearing of the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Subcommittee, 108<sup>th</sup> Cong, 1<sup>st</sup> sess., 15 October 2003, Lexis-Nexis Academic (Search: Political Transcripts: All Transcripts) <<http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>>, [04 December 2003].

<sup>55</sup> Greg Myre, “U.N. Estimates Israeli Barrier Will Disrupt Lives of 600,000.” The New York Times, 12 November 2003, A6.

Carl von Clausewitz, On War

### **Factor Space**

The Israeli security barrier will increase Factor Space for the defense of the Israeli Center of Gravity (COG), the Israeli population, particularly the population centers along the Mediterranean coastal plain which are home to over sixty percent of the Israeli population.<sup>56</sup> With only 15 kilometers of land between the westernmost portion of the West Bank and the coast, it is imperative for Israel to place some sort of obstacle to disrupt the free movement of infiltrators into the heart of the COG. The country's population is much too small to keep vast numbers of military personnel on active duty to cordon the West Bank, which makes the security barrier an effective substitute, acting as a force multiplier for smaller numbers of border patrol forces to neutralize the threat of terrorist infiltrations.<sup>57</sup> It is important to know that a 36 mile long fence was constructed around the Gaza Strip in the mid-1990s and since its completion there have been no successful terrorist penetrations of that barrier.<sup>58</sup>

The security barrier's effectiveness is being compromised in two very crucial ways which will have an adverse impact on its potential usefulness; both compromises stem from its path. By taking in so many Palestinian villages, the Israelis are changing the demographic makeup of the country. This will lead over time, due to higher birthrates of the Arab population, to the Jewish citizens becoming a minority in their own homeland by the year 2020,<sup>59</sup> reduced to running a Jewish apartheid state if they are to remain in power.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> Shalev, 10.

<sup>57</sup> Mati Leshem, "Israel's National Security Strategy: Past and Future Perspectives," (Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 1998), 5.

<sup>58</sup> John Ward Anderson, "Israelis to Extend Fence Line," The Washington Post, 02 October 2003, A1.

<sup>59</sup> Elizur, 106.

<sup>60</sup> Shehadeh, 210-211.

The second adverse impact of the route on Factor Space is that it changes what should be an internationally defendable action to stop terrorist attacks, which Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch classify as war crimes and crimes against humanity,<sup>61</sup> into a polarizing issue that makes even friends of Israel expend political capital to defend.<sup>62</sup> The United States government, possibly Israel's greatest international friend, has gone on record recognizing the Israeli right to protect its citizens with a barrier but at the same time protested the intrusion across the Green Line into Palestinian land. Secretary of State Colin Powell addresses the administration's position this way.

"If you want to put a fence on something that is a recognized border, the green line, then put a fence on your property line. But the more you intrude in Palestinian areas and the more it looks like it could be contiguous intrusion around large sections of Palestinian land that would prejudge subsequent negotiations as to what a Palestinian state may look like, that's a problem."<sup>63</sup>

Continued construction of the barrier inside the green line will act to reduce factor space by reducing the Israeli international diplomatic position.

### **Factor Time**

The barrier will affect Factor Time by increasing the time available to the Israeli Border Patrol for ferreting out individual and group infiltrators. The time it will take to mount an effective penetration of the barrier will also increase, allowing for a more effective defense. In order to penetrate the barrier the potential terrorist will now most likely have to go through a security checkpoint, no longer able to just walk to Tel Aviv, giving additional chances for discovery and warning time to the Israeli security forces. The barrier will also

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<sup>61</sup> Dror Etkes, "Testimony," U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Middle East Peace, Hearing of the Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Subcommittee, 108<sup>th</sup> Cong, 1<sup>st</sup> sess., 15 October 2003, Lexis-Nexis Academic (Search: Political Transcripts: All Transcripts) <<http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>>, [04 December 2003].

<sup>62</sup> Jim Wurst, "U.S. Vetoes Security Council Draft on Israeli Barrier," U.N. Wire, 15 October 2003, <[http://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20031015/449\\_9458.asp](http://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20031015/449_9458.asp)> [04 December 2003].

complicate terrorist planning for infiltration, making it more detailed, lengthy and requiring more coordination; thus discovery is more likely, further increasing warning time. The barrier's path through and around Palestinian areas inside the West Bank also reduces Factor Time for the defender. To the west of the barrier, Palestinian villages cut off from the West Bank Palestinian State will be disaffected by the loss of livelihood and basic freedoms providing additional terrorist recruits behind the main Israeli defensive line. For this reason, the path of the barrier reduces the net gain in Factor Time.

The barrier only acts as a Factor Time multiplier for anti-terrorism; the reduction of territory used for early warning will decrease Factor Time for large scale invasions by standing armies.<sup>64</sup> The Factor Time loss for large scale invasions can, however, be mitigated through the use of modern intelligence gathering sensors regaining lost time through technology. The likelihood of large scale movements of mechanized forces into position to attack Israel through the West Bank without detection is today extremely remote.

### **Factor Force**

Factor Force is positively affected by the security barrier, acting as a force multiplier for Israeli border patrol forces. The barrier also makes it more difficult for Palestinian terror organizations to strike at the Israeli COG or even to get through the defensive lines. However, the greatest effect on Factor Force is the route of the security barrier. The current and planned route that does not conform to the green line negatively affects Factor Force for the Israelis.

The intrusion of the security barrier into Palestinian lands allows the terror organizations to bring global media into play on their side, creating a situation where terrorist

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<sup>63</sup> Glenn Kessler and Peter Slevin, "Powell Criticizes Israel on Fence," The Washington Post, 04 October 2003, A1.

atrocities are justified as “resistance operations”<sup>65</sup> against an overaggressive foe. This negatively affects the options that Israel has for employment of forces to neutralize potential threats. Every time Israel enters into West Bank Palestinian areas to interdict terrorist operations, the global media will be there to document its effects on the Palestinian people.

The planned barrier incursions into the West Bank also work against the Israeli Factor Force equation by increasing the length of the barrier to be guarded by Israeli border patrols. The West Bank border with Israel is only 220 miles long<sup>66</sup> yet the planned barrier, with all its incursions into Palestinian land to the east of the Green Line, will be over 400 miles long.<sup>67</sup> In addition to the extra mileage of barrier to patrol, Israeli forces will have to maintain a large force to screen the 30,000 vehicles a day that pass between Israel and the settlements which will clearly detract from the barrier’s intended purpose.<sup>68</sup>

The intrusion of the security barrier also serves to inflame the Palestinian population. The barrier cuts off Palestinians from their livelihood by surrounding villages, destroying farmland and produce groves. Even when Palestinian farmers can continue to grow food, they have difficulty, due to the barrier, bringing the produce to market. The Israelis counter that the barrier will have numerous gates and agricultural crossings but the more of those gates that are required the greater the likelihood that the cordon will be penetrated. These issues make for a disaffected population where unemployment runs rampant, increasing despair. No longer will the average Palestinian be able to remain a neutral party in the

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<sup>64</sup> Netanyahu, 262.

<sup>65</sup> Greg Myre, “In the Middle East, Even Words Go to War,” The New York Times, 03 August 2003, 4:3.

<sup>66</sup> “Israel,” CIA World Factbook, 18 December 2003,

<<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/is.html>> [25 January 2004].

<sup>67</sup> John Ward Anderson, “Israelis to Extend Fence Line,” The Washington Post, 02 October 2003, A1.

<sup>68</sup> Elizur, 117.

struggle.<sup>69</sup> This situation will make for prime recruitment grounds for terrorist organizations where even mothers volunteer for “martyrdom operations.”<sup>70</sup>

## **Risk**

The security barrier will allow for a withdrawal of Israeli security forces from the West Bank; this could produce some unwanted consequences. Terrorist firepower could be increased with the addition of Man Portable Air Defense Missiles (MANPADS), mortars and long range artillery which is capable from some parts of the West Bank north of Jerusalem of reaching the Mediterranean Sea.<sup>71</sup> The strategic depth that Israel will give up with the introduction of the security barrier and the eventual withdrawal of Israeli forces from the West Bank will require an increased reliance on technology to give it back the depth required for defense.<sup>72</sup> The Mobile-Tactical High Energy Laser (M-THEL) is one such system that can give Israel back that depth. The joint US-Israeli project has already demonstrated its ability to shoot down Katyusha rockets and artillery projectiles.<sup>73</sup> Further advances in technology will allow the conventional view of depth to be altered, thereby enhancing the safety of the populations and reducing tensions.

Another risk of separation and withdrawal that the security barrier could bring is the creation of a failed state or a terrorist state. The continued violence over the last three years of intifada has given increased power to the groups that have openly fought the Israelis namely Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. It is very likely that the Palestinian Authority will not be able to wrest control from these groups, which could lead to civil war and the rise of a terrorist state on the border of Israel. It is therefore

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<sup>69</sup> “A Safety Measure or a Land Grab? Israel’s Security Barrier,” The Economist, 11 (October 2003): 27.

<sup>70</sup> “Martyrdom and Murder,” The Economist, 10 (January 2004): 22.

<sup>71</sup> Shalev, 54.

<sup>72</sup> Leshem, 15.

incumbent on the moderate Arab republics to provide security as well as dismantlement of these groups which their continued Arab neglect has allowed to flourish.

## **Conclusion**

The roots of the debate on construction of the security barrier stem from the very beginning of Zionist thought. A wall of Jewish force that was once seen as the savior of Israel has in some ways become a liability in the fight against Palestinian terrorism. Aggressive defense which worked so well against the Arab armies of the past does not work as well in a counter-terrorism application in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), often being seen as violations of the principles of restraint and thus legitimacy which are at the heart of the principles of MOOTW.<sup>74</sup>

The barrier acts an effective cordon positively affecting Factor Space for the defensive, increasing depth without a physical increase in area. The barrier increases Factor Time for both sides, negatively affecting the terrorist's ability to strike at the Israeli COG. The net gain in Factor Time for the Israelis is reduced because of the barrier's current path. The barrier could alter the Factor Force equation in the Israeli side but due to the path of the security barrier as laid out by the Sharon Government, the barrier's path negatively affects this operational factor for Israeli security.

The Israeli security barrier should conform to the green line, the internationally recognized border between the Palestinian West Bank and Israel. It is also not militarily advisable or sensible to leave the Israeli settlements in place within the West Bank while at the same time building a barrier to increase security; therefore the settlements should be abandoned or bartered away in order to provide a more effective defense of the COG. The

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<sup>73</sup> Robert Wall, "Mobile Laser," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 25 (August 2003): 40-41.

turnover of West Bank Israeli settlements could be offered to the Palestinian State in compensation for the Palestinian abandonment of the demand for “right of return.” By halving the planned distance required to be patrolled, and eliminating the animosity that the many current intrusions of the barrier into the West Bank create, the barrier’s security worth will be enhanced.

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<sup>74</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Joint Pub 3-07, (Washington, DC: 16 June 1995), II-1.

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